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A subaltern pastor versus a dictator
president in the #ThisFlag
movement in Zimbabwe
Theophilus Nenjerama

Abstract
Social movements that challenge political infrastructures require substantial
themes that resonate with the masses. The #ThisFlag movement was the first
massive post-independent social media engendered protest that left an indelible
mark on Zimbabwean politics and history. This study deem the movement the ‘cult
of Mawarire’ due to the centrality of compelling issues used in galvanizing the
masses to action. The cult is a force navigating sacrosanct issues of identity,
politics, and nationalism as inscribed in the flag and the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe. To make meaning of the messages conveyed by Evan Mawarire, the
study references to the videos posted by the pastor on his Facebook and Twitter
accounts which can also be found on YouTube.
Introduction
A wave of protest social movements mobilized through social media activism have
recently occurred in many nations, especially those facing political, economic and
social challenges (Stanko 2013; Sabao and Chikara 2018). Commercial social media
such as Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp and Sina Weibo have taken a central role in
protest communication and mobilization (Sabao and Chikara 2018; Poell 2014).
Countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt are among examples of
contexts where social media amalgamated collective protest voices in speaking
against issues ranging from deteriorating economies, exorbitant living expenses,
and social injustices to tyranny. In South Africa, through the #FeesMustFall and
#RhodesMustFall media campaigns, social media was employed as a strategic and
effective communication method to disrupt the status quo and pursue an activist
role in communicating the poor’s grievances over tuition increases (Mpofu 2015).
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In the Arab Spring, not only was social media useful in protesting against socioeconomic and political injustices, Asif and Yousif (2014) explain that it was
instrumental in the downfall of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia and
Egypt, respectively. This protest wave further intensified mass opposition to
regimes in Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen (Asif and Yousif 2014), changing the
political terrains in the Middle East and North Africa.
Ndlela (2009) hypothesizes media democratization as a result of globalization.
Though the idea is contestable, however, with growing inequalities especially in
repressive contexts, voices of dissent utilize every communicative strategy
available to promulgate narratives relating to standard of life, freedoms (of speech
and assembly), equality and media liberalization. Zimbabwe is one such case
where voices of dissent keep on rising regardless of the government’s oppressive
nature. In 2017, the index of freedom of expression in Zimbabwe recorded a
worrying 37.6%.1 The government exerts control on mass media and independent
media houses, and it is unsurprising that during the #ThisFlag movement, it shut
down the internet for almost two days to halt internet use by protesters. After the
protests, data prices increased up by 500%, with 1GB of data costing US$30.106;
and many Zimbabweans believe this was meant to stop protest continuation and
organization which primarily happened over applications such as WhatsApp
(CANVAS, 2016). Such stifling efforts by the government oppose dictates of
expressionism enshrined in the Constitution, a statute meant to govern activities
in Zimbabwe.
While the government suppresses incongruous voices both on cyber and physical
spaces, it also utilizes media in various ways. Firstly, it influences mass media
platforms to promulgate its ideologies, and secondly, resorts to using online media
services to convey its political ideologies to the general populace. In the build up
to elections in 2018 in Zimbabwe, the government reduced data prices which it
had initially increased in 2016 after the massive #ThisFlag campaign (Magaisa
2018; CANVAS 2016). Magaisa (2018) suggests that the price reduction might have
been because the government anticipated the use of social media, as it
campaigned even through social media platforms, and post-election period the
president’s office launched a mobile application. Though the government exerts
1

Ibrahim Index Of African Governance (IIAG)
http://iiag.online/
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media control as witnessed during the #ThisFlag movement in 2016 and the
January-February 2019 general protests by ordering telecommunications service
providers to shut services, it also acknowledges the power of this communicative
platform through the implementation of the presidential mobile application and
social media accounts on both Twitter and Facebook.
Taking advantage of social media, Pastor Evan Mawarire took to Facebook and
Twitter to communicate his disquiet. The #ThisFlag movement started with a
single video which the pastor posted on his Facebook timeline on 19 April 2016
(Oberdorf 2017). With the Zimbabwean flag as its symbol, #ThisFlag has remained
independent from any political party, with the message of the movement focusing
on anti-corruption and lack of basic services (CANVAS 2016). The pastor – pained,
he said, by not being able to pay for his children’s school fees – posted a video
online in which he, with the Zimbabwean flag wrapped around his shoulders,
passionately describes the official meanings of the colours of the flag: green for
vegetation, yellow for minerals, red for the blood of those who fought for
Zimbabwe’s freedom, and black for the majority people; he then revisited each in
a patriotic telling of the meaning of each (CANVAS 2016). With a large following of
57,178 on Facebook and 292,000 on Twitter as of November 2019, Evan Mawarire
has become a symbol of a historical movement created using social media services
as a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe.
In its creation, the movement became a mobilising tool, and a shrine of mass
engagement on issues pertaining to survival in Zimbabwe. This study defines social
media as the interactive platforms potentially offering collectivism in challenging
exploitation and exclusion; in this case, it was employed by the subaltern who had
limited direct involvement in political dialogues. For this study, the subaltern
presents the overall position of oppressed peasantry, the underclass of society,
people whose voice has been silenced (Rukundwa and Van Aarde 2007; Van
Zoonen 2002). As a variant of new media, social media is used by the subaltern
activist to question the fundamentals of Zimbabwean identity, citizenry’s
exclusion from politics, economic exploitation, liberation struggle and the flag’s
ethos. By questioning these issues, does Mawarire fall within the nationalist
paradigm? This is foregrounded by advancing that the #ThisFlag movement
became a ‘cult of Mawarire’ with the pastor as the populist activist due to
compelling narratives’ centrality on concerns resonating with the masses who
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participated in the viewing and sharing of his videos on social media – leading to
the ‘shutdown’ of Zimbabwe on 6 July 2016. (The word ‘cult’ is used neutrally
here.)

Post-colonial crisis and state laws on media, journalism and activism
During colonial times, Zimbabwe’s white minority ran critical affairs affecting the
existence of both blacks and whites. As power was concentrated to the minority,
media was subsequently state owned as an ideological tool of repression and
control (Ndhlovu 2015; Moyo 2003). Divergent black nationalist voices emerging
as opposition were refused a platform (Ndhlovu 2015). Upon the attainment of
independence from British minority rule in 1980, the black government inherited
the same repressive system used under minority rule. The need to redress this
system was apparent but strides to do so came with challenges for the young
state. As a way to amend these exclusive policies, Mugabe advanced a socialist
ideology (Moyo 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2002). The confidence to embrace the
socialist policies was inspired by global bipolar politics, and the country’s intimate
relationship and indulgence with the socialist block during the struggle for
independence (Moyo 2003). However, this socialist base was challenged
profoundly starting in the early 1990s as the new decade saw the spawning of a
crisis in Zimbabwe. Voices of dissension grew and criticized the socio-political
challenges but the government sought to control these alternative voices which it
regarded as threats to its hegemony. The private press vehemently called for the
democratization process by articulating alternative opinions from mainly the
opposition, civic organizations and the masses (Moyo 2003). The private media
alternatively allowed for the expression of divergent voices criticising the
government.
From late 1990s to 2008, the country witnessed massive political, economic and
social problems resulting in a crisis (Chivandikwa 2012; Raftopoulos 2006). The
crisis period was differently named by scholars: Bond (2006) named it the
‘Zimbabwe’s plunge’, while Raftopolous (2006) named it the ‘Zimbabwean Crisis’.
Others saw the crisis as a result of ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger 2003), a failed
patriarchal model of nationalism (Campbell 2003), along with it a growing and
vibrant oppositional political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
formed in 1999. This nomenclature trend captures a society highly defined by
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economic struggles, models of ill-defined political ideologies resulting in
contestations over humanitarian and democratic concerns and a volatile political
space. For instance, the intimidations and violence perpetrated upon Morgan
Tsvangirai and his subordinates during the 2008 elections, the abductions and
disappearances of activists like Itai Dzamara at the wake of an autocratic leader
who regarded, “democracy as a difficult proposition in Africa”.2
With such a volatile political environment, Zimbabwe became a grieving nation.
The list of longstanding grievances included corrupt and oppressive government,
growing inequalities, looming unemployment, and the rising cost of living (Lim
2012). The escalating list of grievances and the deterioration of the economy
invited numerous opinions of dissent (Chivandikwa 2012). The dissentious
articulations emerged through different platforms and persons, such as, protest
theatre, song, political and human rights activists (Mpofu and Nenjerama 2018),
and recently social media. The rise of social media activism in Zimbabwe marked
a different trajectory in protest mobilization and expression of majority
resentment towards the hegemony and status quo.
However, realizing the centrality of social media in countering propaganda by
state owned media and constructing remonstrative movements against the
political, the government devised different ways including force and stringent
media laws targeted expression in Zimbabwe. Activism has also faced the wrath of
the regime, evidenced by the mysterious disappearances of political activists,
intimidations and abductions. Msonza (2015, 38) points out two unrelated events
where there was the forced disappearance of civil society activist Itai Dzamara on
9 March, and the raid on The Source, a local online news service, on 26 March.
Dzamara’s disappearance sent a message to activists that freedom of expression
in Zimbabwe was indeed an illusion (Msonza, 2015), curbing independent media
growth and resulting in self-censorship by activists and others in fear of facing
arrests or intimidations. At the time of writing this article, the whereabouts of Itai
Dzamara were still unknown.
The Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe, an independent organization that
monitors and safeguards freedom of expression and the output of news on radio
2

Robert Mugabe 2008 speech at the signing of the Government of National Unit with Morgan
Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara under the facilitatorship of SADC delegates led by Thabo
Mbeki at Harare International Conference Centre, Harare, Zimbabwe.
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and television, has expressed concerns over the existence of media laws infringing
on freedom of expression and access to information in Zimbabwe (MISA 2013).
Mass media is propagandistically used by the ZANU PF hegemony in seeking
legitimacy from the majority while denying them any platform to present their
trepidations. In broadening control on media, the government enforced the
Access to Information Protection and Privacy Act (AIPPA), Public Order and
Security Act (POSA) and the Codification and Reform Act. In light of this, MISA
(2013) states that the, POSA and particularly Section 121 of the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act, have been influential in harassing media
practitioners and ordinary Zimbabweans, thereby creating an environment hostile
to media freedom and human rights. These regulations negate the stated aim of
of media regulation to promote media pluralism by controlling entry to the media
(MISA 2013). Although freedom of expression and media democratization are
inherent in the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the realities on the ground speak
otherwise.
Further, critical political and human rights activism faces state suppression. For
instance, the artistic memorialising of the Gukurahundi genocide of 1983 by an
Ndebele artist Owen Maseko, at the Bulawayo gallery was censored and destroyed
by the government security officials and resulted in the arrest of the artist (Mpofu
2015). In response, the concerned Ndebele ethnic group and a sympathetic
populace resorted to using platforms such as Facebook and Twitter as ‘safe’
harbours to discuss the issue of the 1983 Gukurahundi genocide, which has been
strategically ignored by the ZANU PF government (Mpofu 2015 – social media
functions as a platform for citizen engagement and expression in manoeuvring
around state control.
Social media and the subaltern
For this study, the subaltern is used as a concept locating a given group of people
from within a society in their own segment, with limited access to governance,
economic and political participation. Though the Gramscian concept of
subalternity is complex to attach to any group since Gramsci coined the term
referring to workers oppressed by Mussolini’s Fascist Party in Italy, the subaltern,
in that context, were not uniform (Mpofu 2015); a common characteristic defining
the subaltern is the group’s relation to cultural imperialism (Ravengai 2011; Louai
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2011; Spivak 1998). Subalternity refers to a condition of subordination
particularity expressed in various ways such as race, ethnicity, gender, nationality,
age, class or any condition which creates a space for difference and resistance
(Ravengai 2011). Ravengai’s depiction of the subaltern as a ‘subordinated
particularity… of difference and resistance’ implies a dislocated individual or group
seeking a restoration of their rights and belonging. It implies clear contestations
between the powerful and the powerless, the marginalised and the marginaliser.
Social media therefore in this context turns communication into interactive
dialogues among communities and individuals (Sabao and Chikara 2019; Stanko
2013). The services that social media offers can be understood as ‘alternative
spaces’ to traditional media, offered by new media to present ‘secure’ spaces for
deliberation (Mpofu 2015). Congruently, in the ‘Arab spring’ movement social
media was a space for expanding and sustaining the networks upon which social
movements depend, and this revolt exemplify how online social networks
facilitated by social media have become a key ingredient of contemporary populist
movements (Lim 2012). Cyber-enthusiasts expressed a good deal of optimism
about the ability of the new media to empower people living in non-democratic
societies (Wolfsfeld et al 2013). Now internet citizens, known as netizens, make
their innermost thoughts known to the world through social networking sites and
blogs without anyone’s permission (Stanko 2013). As demonstrated by the social
media discussion of ‘taboo’ issues such as the 1983 genocide (Mpofu 2015), this
perspective translates social media into a subversive platform which allows for
connectivity among the marginalised and disenfranchised.
Social media initiates a representative usage by the populist in political discourses.
It becomes a strategic tool used by populists to circumvent and interact with
traditional media coverage, and also as a tool that simultaneously shapes the
populist message in the act of mediation (Sorensen 2016). It is not simply a neutral
tool to be used or adopted by social movements, but rather influence how activists
form and shape the social movements (Lim 2012). The platform is used to arbitrate
messages that pertain to a people’s struggle and the remediation of key issues
affecting their belonging and survival. The medium becomes a part of the
message: populists utilise social media affordances and cyber‐utopic ideology to
answer the challenges of modern mediated representation (Sorensen 2016). It
becomes a contrivance for a challenging mobilisation against a hegemony and the
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perpetration of civil rights as it offers a space for interactive conveyance of protest
sentiments, action and social movements.

Making the #ThisFlag movement
The study is centred on the use of social media in the creation and sustenance of
the #ThisFlag movement. The study advances that the #ThisFlag movement
became a cult of Mawarire as the populist activist due to different compelling
topics that resonated with the masses and convinced them to partake in the July
6 ‘shutdown’. For this cult to function, the centralization of the flag in challenging
nationalistic identity discourses and political dominance against a struggling socioeconomic unstable nation became a key point. In the analysis of Mawarire’s
videos, three fundamental topics characterising the movement emerged: (i) the
flag, nationalism and an identity in crisis; (ii) the continuing crisis as the citizens’
grievance, (iii) the liberation struggle and the state. These are explained in sections
below, using excerpts of the messages expressed by Mawarire in the videos he
posted on his Facebook page, which are also available on YouTube.

i) The flag, nationalism and an identity in crisis
Flags resemble nations though their distinct decorative features. The Zimbabwean
flag with all its colours and decorations marks what Zimbabwe is in discourses of
nationhood and nation making. This can be understood given the background of
declaration of independence and transition of power from white minority rule to
black governance on 18 April 1980. This transition ushered in a new beginning and
meaning to what being Zimbabwean was – as the Union Jack was lowered, a new
Zimbabwean flag was installed. This historical event marked a new trajectory in
Zimbabwean politics and its nationalistic discourses, with political leaders basing
their rhetoric on sovereignty and independence. However, the challenge that
befell Zimbabwe is that nationalism in the post-colonial state became a pervasive
principle used to advance an agenda created for and by the government.
Nationalism became a tangled concept with varying contestations. That is, a
people called ‘Zimbabweans’ became a product of the nationalist struggle rather
than a pre-colonial or primordial identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). These
contestations and nationalist struggles are evident in Mawarire’s narratives as he
centres the flag in messages of identity and citizenship.
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A nation’s identity is first physically shown by the flag, a symbolic representation
with varying meanings. The adoption of a new flag at the Independence Day
marked an installation of a new identity which characterized what Zimbabwe was
and was to be. Evan Mawarire constructs the movement around these shifted
dynamics: the flag being a bearer of a Zimbabwean identity born out of colonial
conquest. The movement also relates the flag and its importance as a symbol of
cultural identity in the modern world (Eriksen 2007). With this, the movement
defined itself as purely Zimbabwean, and with no third force behind it as is usually
deemed any oppositional voice by the government. Mawarire asserts:
The flag is my country, they tell me that the black is for the majority
people like me and yet for some reason I don’t feel like I am a part of it. I
look at it sometimes and I wonder is it a story of my future or of a sad
past. Wherever I go, I put on the colours, they look at me, as if they want
to laugh, they ask me, are you from Zimbabwe? Vachiseka (mockingly)
(Evan Mawarire, Day 1 Video, 19 April 2016).
Mawarire conjures up a revived nationalism foregrounded on and compared with
the one that prevailed during the colonial times. However, critical questions arise
as to what nationalism is and its constituents especially in contexts marked by
contestations and varying beliefs and opinions in relation to nationhood and
identity. Mawarire brings to the fore questions asked by Msindo (2005 in NdlovuGatsheni 2011, 31) about nationalism and how it functioned pre independence in
Zimbabwe. Was nationalism about defining a nation in which questions such as
‘Who are we?’ and ‘Who should be part of the nation?’ The cult centralizes the
flag in forging a treatise that resuscitates influential principles constituting
liberation struggles and their relevance post-independence. The pastor’s
messages contests nationalist politics marked by coercion and violence; the
promises and values of nationalism also became important reference points for
community demands on the political parties and the post-colonial state
(Raftopolous and Mlambo 2009, 12). Thus, the protest cult of Mawarire
resuscitated and revived a modified sense of nationalistic demands based on nonviolent protests in a post-colonial state – especially so, with the flag as a reference
point to his demands as a citizen of the country.
Inherent in the Zimbabwean flag and nationalistic rhetoric is black as an identity.
This identity greatly influenced the mobilization of black Zimbabweans during the
colonial era. It was therefore perpetuated in ZANU PF ideologies as the basis of
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legitimacy and connection with the citizenry. However, the populist cult
challenges this principle as concept that has lost meaning in the face of postcolonial troubles in Zimbabwe. He challenges identity and nation-making
attempts. Mawarire says:
They tell me that the black is for the majority people like me and yet for
some reason I don’t feel like I am a part of it (Evan Mawarire, Day 1
Video, 19 April 2016).
At the core of his sentiments is the revelation of an ill-defined identity leading to,
perhaps, systemic exclusion. There is a disjoint between the government’s actions
and the meaning portrayed by black as a colour on the flag. Explaining the
importance of national symbols, particularly Zimbabwe’s, (Ndimandea and Moyo
2018) observe that anthems are both ‘inward looking and outward looking’, they
shape and advance a self-conceptualisation of what the Zimbabwean nation state
is, its virtues. However, Mawarire decries the Zimbabwean national project as
affected by the tribulations, crises and problems that continue to affect the
national making project (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). To Onslaw (2011), it has also
become ‘a battle for the state’, and this battle is continuing to play out in presentday Zimbabwe. The state has concentrated on defining itself and Zimbabweans,
consequently with uncertain results especially in the backdrop of a hegemonic
power that relentlessly manoeuvres credible electoral processes to initiate change
in Zimbabwe.
The different colours on the country’s flag are key representative elements used
to justify and speak of the ‘Zimbabweanness’ of the Zimbabweans. Black
represents the black majority, the black persons who Mugabe regarded as the
rightful owners of the nation. The colour is also representative and useful in
identity creation in Zimbabwe and this is used in driving forward the ZANU PF
ideology of creating a nation which the political want. While to Ndimandea and
Moyo (2018) national symbols are important markers in imagining the nationstate and in understanding nationalism, to Mawarire the flag has become a
resemblance of an identity characterized by contestations, vagueness and
mockery due to the seclusion of the citizenry in making pivotal decisions pertaining
to their survival and belonging in the nation. Mawarire interrogates his identity,
belonging and citizenship and how the hegemony and the status quo has led to
the deprivation of the Zimbabwean ordinary citizen. Implicitly, the movement
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portrays the ordinary Zimbabweans’ sentiments on accepted norms of how the
flag is a pillar of nationhood, along with institutions such as the shared historical
narrative (Eriksen 2007; Hobsbawm 1990). The pastor quests for a (re)creation of
a Zimbabwe truly reflective of the flag since the current state contradicts the flag’s
ethos.
To the cult, the flag implies collectivism. The pastor shows a people fighting for
well-defined common causes as the dominant tropes and images of suffering in
#ThisFlag are unflattering to post-independence Zimbabwe and even question the
perception of the once-imagined collective aspirations of the majority (Rwafa and
Vambe 2007). In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government imagined a Zimbabwe
characterized by socialist and collectivist theories. However, even as the
Zimbabwean state has asserted its Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist credentials
in fostering collective understanding to nationhood viz-a-via economic challenges,
the main opposition group MDC, labour and civic movements called for different
forms of solidarity and sovereignty that have democratic rights of citizens at their
centre (Raftopolous and Mlambo 2009). The delicate issues of realizing a state-asnation are fundamentally evident as portrayed by disagreeing opinions between
the state and the majority, and in this case, the movement is against government
which has failed to lead the realization of a Zimbabwe once imagined in early years
of independence. The flag which once was a unifying factor at independence now
exhibits the divide between the state and the masses, consequently imperilling
the Zimbabwean identity.
In addition, Mawarire decries an identity in crisis. The pastor reveals doubt,
uncertainty, darkness, instability and fears about his social identity, as he feels
excluded from the vocabulary of Zimbabwe’s political and cultural nationalism
(Rwafa and Vambe 2007). He declares:
This flag…I don’t feel as if I want to be part of it… It feels as if I want to
belong to another country. Wherever I go I put the colours of Zimbabwe
and as if they want a laugh they ask me are you from Zimbabwe? (Evan
Mawarire, Day 1 Video, 19 April 2016).
Critical in Mawarire’s message is the relationship between the flag-as-a-national
representation, and citizens-as-a-nation represented by the flag. The cult usurps
politics surrounding citizenry political participation as elite nationalists defines the
ordinary Zimbabweans into homogenous categories such as ‘workers’, ‘peasants’,
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or more worryingly, the so-called ‘masses’ (Munochiveyi 2011). It reveals how in
post-colonial Zimbabwe, the nationalist struggle only succeeded in creating the
nation-as-state but failed dismally to create the nation-as-people (NdlovuGatsheni 2011). The populist’s cult is a constructs demystifying the concept of
‘patriotic history’ as an ideology constructed through the grounding of legitimacy
in a historical narrative of the 1970s liberation struggle that asserted the ZANU PF
party’s dominance and exploited its seniority in terms of liberation struggle
credentials (Alexander and MacGregor 2013). This ideology excluded voices of
dissent against violence, corruption, authoritarianism as voices characterised by
western influence, especially the MDC which exists as variant to ZANU PF regime.
It further created a divide between partakers and non-partakers in the liberation
war, exemplifying the serious limitations of patriotic history as dangerously onesided, narrow and divisive (Raftopolous and Mlambo 2009; Ranger 2004). The
meaning of the colours black and red on the flag therefore became entangled in
the perpetuation of a one-sided narrative of history favouring the ZANU PF
hegemonic ideologies. The idea and belief of a unified national identity becomes
endangered as dissent voices are refused space in Zimbabwe. The #ThisFlag cult
therefore marshals the ordinary people to an insightful understanding of the
limited or none existence of democracy, political injustices and political
segregations based on historicity.

ii) The continuing crisis as the citizens’ grievances
An analysis of the videos by Mawarire reveal a repressive state and a dangerous
political field where protest voices are suppressed. In forging the divergent cult,
the populist acknowledges that traversing on sensitive issues may result in his
arrest. With his acknowledgement, he also motivates people to sustain the
movement as it seeks to instigate change in Zimbabwe. He states:
You can arrest Mawarire if you want but takawanda (there is many of us
to sustain the movement) You can take one person but you can’t take the
whole country (Evan Mawarire, Day 12 Video, 15 May 2016).
The political terrain and activist activities have been characterised by intimidations
and violence justified by the need to protect the sovereignty of the people. To
Mugabe, the political terrain is sacrosanct and reserved for ZANU PF to deal with.
This implies that talking, commenting and criticising negatively about the
hegemony is to play with fire, hence Mawarire acknowledges that his recalcitrant
actions can get him arrested. This was also confirmed by Mugabe in his speech in
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the aftermath of July 6 massive stay-away that, “those who protest against us are
not one of us”3. To Mugabe, the post-independent state should not be challenged
and any contrarian voice does not fit within discourses of belonging and citizenship
in Zimbabwe, as the usual understanding is that protest voices are characterised
by Western dictates and discourses of regime change. Reactionary, the
government promulgated and enacted into law the Cybercrime and Cybersecurity
Act, which saw Patrick Chinamasa being appointed the first minister of the newly
created Ministry of Cyber Security (Sabao and Chikara 2018). The government’s
exposes its baseless social support behind longstanding authoritarian rulers, and
its trust in the use of force and the culture of threat (Asif and Yousif 2014).
The citizens’ political participation is one tenet enshrined in discourses of
democracy. However, the movement’s messages reveal the citizenry’s and ‘nongovernmental organizations’ complaints about the centralist thrust of state policy
(or state centred development), and about the inaccessibility of policy decisions’
(Kerkhoven 1992, 22 in Murisa, 2010, 16). The government maintains a policy of
exclusion resulting in civic calls for public engagement in policy making processes.
The pastor suggests an alternative for both the masses and the government
officials:
You cannot ignore us anymore, stop talking to yourselves, taurai nevanhu
kunoku (government officials talk to the citizens). We are the people that
are being affected by the things you are doing. What happened to talking
to us? This flag is citizen’s movement, citizens get your own phone, make
your own video… (Evan Mawarire, Day 10 Video, 15 May 2016).
Mawarire’s call to action reveals critical points which are; the grandiose possibility
of social media to foster citizen-citizen dialogue, and also citizen-government
dialogue. Though the later may not occur instantaneously, but because social
media allows the distribution of content, there is a possibility of messages to reach
the government officials’ accounts. Mawarire exploited the significance of
alternative digital public sphere to empower, coordinate and popularize political
processes and protests at both national and international levels (Sabao and
Chikara 2018).

Robert Mugabe’s Speech 2016 at the 1 Million-Men march which was organized to show support
for the president and the party.
3
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The movement reveals the state ideology and dominant party political rhetoric as
one which emerged from the hegemonic and authoritarian circumstances of the
nationalist liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003), whose political and
economic policies favoured white colonialists. This has been further compounded
by contestations around election results and the ‘rule of law’ in general (Murisa
2013). The pastor denounced officials’ failure:
The policies that the government has had in place have not worked for us
the people, you’ve failed us, matikanya (you’ve inconvenienced us),
matisiya panze panotonhora (you’ve left us in the cold) (Evan Mawarire,
Day 22 Video, 22 May 2016).
Recognizing policies of separatism by the government officials, Mawarire takes to
social media to castigate the officials and the economic meltdown whose causes
are multifaceted, ranging from economic mismanagement on the part of
government to structural constraints within the local economy and also the
international economic system (Murisa 2010). The pastor lampoons the
government concentrating on methods of clinging to power at the expense of the
generality.
Mawarire uses populist terms to amalgamate and appeal to people in his
messages. The populist pastor identifies a jobless society, and a jeopardized
sociality. He reveals Zimbabwe as being marred by economic meltdown, shrinking
industrial activity, closure of manufacturing companies and downsizing of some,
and consequent high unemployment rates (Murisa 2010).
We are still without jobs, mabasa hatina (we do not have jobs), chikafu
hatina (we do not have food), we are still without 15 billion dollars. It is
time for us as citizens to organize ourselves and find a better Zimbabwe
(Evan Mawarire, Day 26 Video, 30 May 2016).
[W]e are protesting against the Zimbabwean government, leaders and
ministers saying enough is enough. We have had enough of corruption,
injustice, poverty and unemployment (Evan Mawarire, Day 3 Video, 21
April 2016).
The use of the collective term ‘we’ contextualises Mawarire’s message as a
representative claim (Saward 2006 in Soresen 2016, 3). He encapsulates and
expresses the ordinary Zimbabwean’s concerns on nepotism, corruption, a failed
economy and wealth amassing by the political elite. The pastor challenges
nationalism as the taken-for-granted ideology which binds the citizenry to the
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state, or the nation (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009). For instance, he questions the
whereabouts of the proceeds from the Marange diamonds and other minerals in
Zimbabwe. The pastor removes the veil of hypocrisy surrounding the ideology of
patriarchy and cultural nationalism, all of which insist on enforcing notions of
collective identities that valorise ‘national visions’ at the expense of individual and
personal experiences (Rwafa and Vambe 2007).

iii) The liberation struggle and the state
The liberation wars of brought about independence in Zimbabwe. During the first
democratic elections held in Zimbabwe, leading to her liberation, ZANU PF leader
Robert Mugabe won the elections in 1980. With this achievement Zimbabwe
entered the crucial ‘moment of arrival’ that saw ZANU PF taking over the state and
making efforts to mobilise the general population behind a vanguardist party and
a vanguardist developmental state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009). Coupled
with it was the land and race question which formed the centrepiece of ZANU PF’s
definition of belonging, citizenship, exclusion and the whole history of Zimbabwe
as a nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). ZANU PF therefore endeavoured to be the
watchdog of the liberation struggle, its promises and the projected future brought
about by the political change. It thus hoped to define the trajectory on which
Zimbabwe was to take as a post-colonial state.
However, with the rise of critical divergent political voices criticizing the
hegemony, especially at the turn of the new millennium, ZANU PF – trying to
protect and maintain its political base and relevance – created a political
participation mythology based on liberation credentials, especially in key positions
like the presidency. Commenting on liberation and post-liberation oppositional
voices, Mazingi and Kamidza (2011, 322) assert that, ‘the need to redress
inequalities was part of the broader agitation for an end to colonialism, however,
the widening of inequality since the mid-1990s continued to occupy the agenda of
opposition political parties and broader sections of civil society’. These formative
discourses have continued to forge political cultures dominating the domestic
political arena post-independence (Onslaw 2011) even recently as evidenced the
#ThisFlag. The cult of Mawarire revisits the principles that resulted in
Zimbabweans forging a violent movement against white rule from both the first
liberation struggle and the second liberation struggle. These principles were
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characterized by calls for equality, democracy and a non-elitist rule and political
participation and involvement of the majority.
In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the ideology of the liberation struggle became a base
for differing opinions. To ZANU PF, nationalism became a mobilising ideology, with
far more influence on the course of the liberation struggle and the politics of the
postcolonial state especially to cadres of the liberation struggle and people with a
link to the movement (Raftopolous 2006). Differently, to the populist cult,
liberation struggle defined a sense of nationalism that is non-exclusive of the
commonality, advancing a message with an agency of non-politicization of natural
resources and their distribution. In one of Mawarire’s videos he questions where
the proceeds of the diamonds have gone and if they benefitted the Zimbabwean
generality. The #ThisFlag movement speaks and interrogates the liberation
struggle in relation to ‘the material inequalities that have divided Zimbabwean
society into classes (rich and poor). The cynicism expressed at this uneven sharing
of the country’s resources is captured in a manner that brings out those excesses
which underpin the vulgarity of power and powerlessness in […] Zimbabwe’
(Rwafa and Vambe 2007, 78). In this sense, the liberation struggle becomes an
insignificant element upon which to base the legitimacy of the state – since it has
failed to uphold the principles that led to the forging of the struggle. ZANU PF
becomes a hegemony that has gone astray.
The movement further questions ZANU PF’s hegemonic legitimacy in post-colonial
Zimbabwe against a background of a suffering populace. Raftopolous (2006)
chronicles the birth of post-independent leftist voices as having begun to emerge
out of the struggles of civil society against the postcolonial state, firstly the late
1980s activism of students and workers, and secondly with the mobilisation of civil
society against state authoritarianism from the late 1990s. The #ThisFlag
movement forms a part of the fabric of opposing voices demanding redefinition
and revival of the meaning of Zimbabwe in relation to the liberation struggle. Thus
he asks:
If those who fought for our independence were to come back and see
what has happened…if they were here they would demand that their
blood be brought back (Evan Mawarire, Day 1 Video, 19 April 2016).
Mawarire’s sentiments fall into the paradigm of thoughts that ‘students, workers
and some intellectuals developed [as a] growing critique of the postcolonial state,
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[with critical] attention to rethinking the legacies of the liberation struggles and
placing more central attention on the struggles for human and civic rights’
(Raftopoulos 2006, 206). The pastor creates the movement juxtaposing the
current state of the nation and liberties, freedoms, political and economic
emancipation fought for during the struggle. The state, however perpetuates a
dogmatic identity hinged on liberation struggle, a tradition which leads to the rise
in civil voices calling for an inclusive identity based on the meaning of being a
citizen of the nation than on historicity which excludes a particular group based
on age, sex or tribal origins.
The movement further analyses nationalist projects and policies as tools in nationbuilding and how they have failed in the post-colonial context which has been
marred by economic imbalances due to authoritarian tendencies. The government
is exclusive in engaging the masses in nation-building projects; thus the pastor
fights for policies of inclusion:
We are demonstrating to you, about what it is about what we want you
to take note of, stop talking to intellectuals only, talk to us the ordinary
people. Stop ambushing us with policy changes overnight. What
happened to talking to us? Munongomuka makachinja zvinhu (you
suddenly change things without engaging the masses) Kudhara (before)
you used to announce 6 months before explaining why you were doing it,
the consequences. Talk to us don’t ambush us with policies (Evan
Mawarire, Day 10 Video, 15 May 2016).
Since independence there has been a growth in the divide between the political
elite and the citizenry. Social media has galvanised a movement to provoke the
state into initiating dialogue with the masses.
As nationalism is centred on the characterisation and definition of particular
nation through key including shared historicity and identity, the movement
culminates as a point to the reviewing of the political performance of the postindependent government in Zimbabwe. Wolfsfeld et al (2013) theorize that for a
movement to occur there should be fundamental aspects inspiring it. Inspired by
political ideologies such as nationalism, which insists on making people seek the
political kingdom first, under the assumption that other worlds (such as economic
freedom and social justice) will automatically open up (Rwafa and Vambe 2007).
Similarly, it is a disclosure of the failure of the state and the use of the liberation
struggle,
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Nyika yapara necorruption, injustice, poverty, nehudzvanyiriri, nenhamo
nyika haichagarika ino iyi, hurumende yedu zvakwana, hamungarambe
muchitibata zvamurikubata muchiita. Nyika yafa.
The country is greatly affected by corruption, poverty and a dictatorship.
This country is no longer favourable and conducive for us to live in. We
tell our government that enough is enough, they can’t keep treating us
like this. Our country is dead (Evan Mawarire, Day 13 Video, 15 May
2016).
As the post-independent state insisted on nation-making agendas by maintain the
nationalist-revolutionary ideologies with the liberation war as the main
foundation myth of the new nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009, 5), the
pastor, however, suggests that the Zimbabwean spirit of collective good has been
worn out in the wear and tear induced by individual greed for both political and
material power (Rwafa and Vambe 2007, 82). The social movement cult refuses to
confirm and conform to the myth of national stability that is peddled by those
‘eating on behalf of the majority’ (Rwafa and Vambe 2007). The movement
represents collective grievances against the government, a fundamental element
to the creation and maintenance of his cult, which he used to find legitimacy with
the masses as he conjures up daily themes affecting them.

Conclusion
The study focused on analysing the making of the #ThisFlag movement through
the use of social media. It provided three theoretical frameworks that functioned
significantly for the movement to leave an indelible mark on Zimbabwean history
and political terrain especially in discourses of citizen activism. The study also
alluded to the movement as a cult of Mawarire premised on the national flag, it
explored issues of identity, nationalism, liberation war and socio-political spheres.
To this study, the movement became a cult because of the influence of the
populist pastor. Due to the exertion of control on media by the state through
legislation, the cult amalgamated the citizenry’s voices through social media to
challenge the government’s violation of human rights, authoritarianism and the
legitimacy of the ZANU PF hegemony.
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